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Avian influenza that infects poultry in close proximity to
humans is a concern because of its pandemic potential. In
2004, an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza
H7N3 occurred in poultry in British Columbia, Canada.
Surveillance identified two persons with confirmed avian
influenza infection. Symptoms included conjunctivitis and
mild influenzalike illness.
I
nfluenza is the most diversified in birds, particularly in
wild waterfowl (1). Concern exists that outbreaks of
avian influenza in domestic poultry could, through a
process of genetic reassortment, mutation, or both, intro-
duce new influenza subtypes into the human population. In
the context of widespread susceptibility, such an event
could be the precursor of a pandemic (2,3).
An outbreak of avian influenza emerged on a farm in
the Fraser Valley of British Columbia on February 6, 2004.
Slightly increased deaths (8–16 deaths/day) were noted
among 9,200 chickens in one barn. Avian influenza infec-
tion was confirmed on February 16, 2004, and later geno-
typic and phenotypic intravenous pathogenicity index
(IVPI) testing characterized the virus as low pathogenicity
avian influenza (LPAI) H7N3. On the same farm, an adja-
cent barn that contained 9,030 chickens had a dramatic
increased in deaths from February 17 through 19 (2,000
deaths in 2 days). Genotypic and IVPI testing confirmed
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H7N3 in this
second flock.
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency ordered the
culling of both flocks and initiated active avian influenza
surveillance on all farms within 5 km, but the virus spread
nonetheless. On April 5, the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency ordered depopulation of all poultry in the Fraser
Valley south of the Fraser River (19 million birds). In total,
the Canadian Food Inspection Agency identified avian
influenza in 42 of the ≈600 commercial poultry farms in
the region and in 11 backyard flocks, which represented
≈1.3 million birds (4). The last infected farm was identi-
fied on May 21, 2004.
To mitigate the risk for human infection and the poten-
tial for genetic reassortment, federal workers involved in
the depopulation were required to wear personal protective
equipment, including N95/North 7700 masks, gloves, gog-
gles, and biosafety suits and footwear. They were also
required to take prophylactic oseltamivir at a dose of 75
mg per day for the duration of exposure plus 7 days and to
receive the commercially available human influenza vac-
cine for the 2003-04 season, if they had not already done
so (5). All protective measures were provided free of
charge and were recommended also for exposed farm
workers and their families. Following reports of human ill-
ness, these measures were more rigorously promoted and
reinforced through worker screening, information letters
prepared by the British Columbia Centre for Disease
Control, and media bulletins. 
We report the results of enhanced surveillance for
human illness in association with this poultry outbreak of
HPAI H7N3 in British Columbia.
The Study
After the first report to public health authorities of
poultry outbreaks on February 18, 2004, enhanced surveil-
lance for conjunctivitis and influenzalike illnesses was
implemented for federal workers, farm workers and their
household contacts, and any other potentially exposed per-
sons. Illness was reported to the British Columbia Centre
for Disease Control by using a standard questionnaire and
report form. Respiratory specimens were tested at the
British Columbia Centre for Disease Control by reverse
transcription–polymerase chain reaction for influenza and
by cell culture for all respiratory pathogens; influenza iso-
lates were sequenced to determine the subtype (e.g., H7).
Suspected human cases were defined as illness in persons
presenting after February 6, 2004, with two or more new
or worsening conjunctivitis or influenzalike symptoms,
with onset from 1 day after first exposure (defined as
direct contact or shared air space) to 7 days after last expo-
sure to a potential source of avian influenza virus in the
Fraser Valley. Confirmed cases had laboratory-confirmed
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geal, or throat specimens by reverse transcription–poly-
merase chain reaction (6) or cell culture. Influenza
hemagglutinin and neuraminidase subtyping was per-
formed at the National Microbiology Laboratory. Serum
samples were tested for antibody to influenza A (H7) by
hemagglutination inhibition and microneutralization
assays (7) at the National Microbiology Laboratory.
Microneutralization assays were repeated at the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on serum sam-
ples from two persons with confirmed infections and from
eight persons with suspected cases.
Approximately 2,000 poultry farm workers are in the
Fraser Valley. Approximately 650 federal workers assisted
with outbreak management and control; not all had poultry
exposure. From February 18 to June 1, 2004, a total of 77
symptomatic persons were reported to the British Columbia
Centre for Disease Control. Fifty-seven had suspected (n =
55) or confirmed (n = 2) avian influenza infections.
Among the 20 reports that did not meet the suspected or
confirmed case definitions, 9 had insufficient information
to determine case status, 3 did not meet the symptom
requirements, 3 did not have a relevant exposure history, 1
had onset before February 6, 3 had onset >7 days after
exposure, and 1 had onset <1 day after exposure.
Baseline characteristics are shown in Table 1, and the
epidemic curve is shown in the Figure. Respiratory symp-
toms predominated (Table 2) among the 55 patients with
suspected cases. Symptom duration was 1–58 days. No
patients were hospitalized. Twelve (22%) reported taking
prophylactic oseltamivir at symptom onset, and 11 (20%)
received oseltamivir for treatment. The remaining 22
patients with suspected cases were identified >48 hours
after onset or refused treatment. All recovered fully.
Respiratory specimens (nasal, nasopharyngeal, throat,
and conjunctival) were collected from 47 patients with sus-
pected cases (86%) an average of 5 days after onset (range
0–27 days). Cell culture identified pathogens in two per-
sons: adenovirus type 3 in one (conjunctival and nasal
specimens) and HSV-1 in another (throat specimen). All
other results were negative for respiratory viruses, includ-
ing influenza. No antibody to influenza A H7 could be
detected in paired acute- and convalescent-phase serum
samples (n = 17), drawn an average of 9 days (range 0–33
days) and 31 days (range 18–88 days) after onset, respec-
tively, or in convalescent-phase serum samples (n = 8)
drawn an average of 28 days (range 8–56) after onset  from
patients with suspected cases.
Influenza A H7N3 infection was confirmed in two men
(40 and 45 years of age) exposed on different farms March
13 and March 22–23. Both had direct conjunctival contact
with infected poultry. One was not wearing eye protection,
and the other was wearing glasses that were bypassed by a
feather. Neither was taking oseltamivir prophylaxis.
Neither was vaccinated against human influenza virus.
Symptoms developed 1–3 days after exposure (March 16
and 24). Conjunctivitis and coryza developed in the first
patient, and conjunctivitis and headache developed in the
second. Both received oseltamivir treatment, and symp-
toms resolved fully. Active daily surveillance by the local
health unit identified no secondary cases.
Influenza A H7N3 virus was isolated from a nasal spec-
imen from one man (A/Canada/444/04) and a conjunctival
specimen from the other (A/Canada/504/04); both samples
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Figure. Onset of symptoms for suspected and confirmed cases in
humans and identification of infected commercial poultry flocks,
highly pathogenic avian influenza H7N3, British Columbia, 2004.
Date for poultry flock is either the date the flock was suspected to
be infected (because of clinical illness) or the date the sample was
taken as part of surveillance.were collected within 1 day of onset. No antibody to
influenza AH7 could be detected by hemagglutination inhi-
bition or microneutralization assays in serum samples col-
lected 34 days and 8 and 22 days after onset, respectively.
Virus isolated from birds on the same source farm as
the human isolate A/Canada/444/04 was confirmed as
HPAI H7N3 by genotyping and IVPI. Virus from birds on
the same source farm as A/Canada/504/04 showed inser-
tion sequence match with HPAI H7N3, but IVPI was not
performed (C. Kranendonk, National Centre for Foreign
Animal Disease, pers. comm.). Both human isolates con-
tained an insertion sequence similar to that seen only in the
HPAI avian virus. These insertion sequences vary from the
poultry virus by one and two amino acid differences,
respectively. Based on the consensus sequence for HPAI
H7 viruses, only A/Canada/504/04 is likely highly patho-
genic in chickens (8). Phenotypic pathogenicity testing on
the human isolates is ongoing.
Conclusions
We report the first known human avian influenza H7N3
infections. Although enhanced surveillance identified 57
persons meeting a suspected case definition, avian influen-
za infection was confirmed in only 2. The two patients had
conjunctivitis and mild, influenzalike illnesses, similar to
symptoms reported from the Netherlands in association
with another H7 subtype (H7N7) (9). Neither confirmed
case in British Columbia mounted a hemagglutination
inhibition or serum neutralizing antibody response. This
finding has been observed elsewhere in association with
avian influenza infection (10,11). A possible explanation
includes highly localized infection without induction of
systemic antibody. Mechanical trauma, irritation due to
dust or airborne particulate matter, or an allergic cause of
symptoms associated with viral contamination, rather than
infection, is less likely given the delay to symptom onset,
consistent with the incubation period for influenza. 
Among suspected cases, respiratory rather than con-
junctival symptoms predominated. Other pathogens were
also detected among suspected case reports, a finding con-
sistent with the relatively nonspecific case definition
applied.
From February 6 to May 21, 2004, routine influenza
surveillance activities in the Fraser Valley also identified
human influenza A from nine persons and two long-term
care facility outbreaks. Although no coinfections were
identified, this human influenza activity increased con-
cerns about potential mixture of avian influenza with
human influenza strains.
Avian influenza H7 has caused human illness previous-
ly, most notably 89 confirmed human infections, including
one death in the Netherlands in 2003 (9). Based on the
precedent set by the Netherlands in protecting exposed
persons, British Columbia recommended comprehensive
precautions for workers early in the outbreak. These pre-
cautions may have prevented further human infections.
The strain circulating in British Columbia may have been
more limited in its ability to cause human illness. The
genomic sequence of the avian viruses from the source
farms of the two human isolates was consistent with HPAI,
whereas one of the human isolates was consistent with
LPAI. The presence of an insertion sequence in the human
LPAI isolate likely signifies that the virus in poultry mutat-
ed from HPAI to LPAI, and both were circulating among
the birds on that source farm, the latter undetected. A less
likely explanation is that mutation from HPAI to LPAI
occurred in the human host.
To date, illness in humans from H7 subtypes differs
markedly in severity from that of avian influenza H5N1
(12). Their lower virulence should not be inferred to indi-
cate lower pandemic potential since subclinical or mild
infections may have greater opportunity through surrepti-
tious spread to reassort and through mutation to become
more virulent. A compilation and detailed overview of the
protective measures used in all avian influenza outbreaks
would help to estimate the actual risk to persons and pop-
ulations. Recommendations for precautions that are both
necessary and reasonable during future poultry outbreaks
could then be refined.
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